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Canon-Making and the Italian Tradition of Moral Enquiry* 
 
 
This paper will focus on the tradition which, departing to some degree from the 
Renaissance treatises on manners, embodied, on the threshold of the modern age, a new 
ideal of citizenship. I am especially interested in examining the influence of the Galateo 
by Giovanni della Casa, the seminal text of a minor tradition of “moral enquiry” which I 
plan to re-read and situate in a different context1. I will seek to show that this text is a 
breakthrough within the tradition which originated from early-modern treatises on 
courtesy. With the Galateo the age-old tradition of Courtesy Books is at a crossroad. 
This paper is a preliminary draft of a chapter of a book I have been planning to write 
on the ‘Italian canon’, namely, of that stock of books “eminentemente citabili”2 which 
have been accorded a special condition of eminence in curricula. If we assume that a 
canon is a cultural artefact whose construction depends on specific policies of 
inclusion/exclusion, my thesis is that in the making of such a cultural construction as an 
Italian canon, the Galateo seems to have been confined to a rank which part brings to the 
fore its literary eminence, part purges the text of its significance for moral philosophy. 
This process of marginalization, which will be explored in the third section of this essay, 
ends up jeopardizing the moral teaching the text aims to convey. I will argue that the 
‘loss’ of this text, in other words, the dwindling of its condition of eminence as a piece of 
moral philosophy, entails a loss in our ability to make sense of some of the ways - ways I 
deem highly valuable – by which we may be encouraged to interact with one another in 
society. What we have lost is a set of linguistic ‘practices’, namely, those modes of moral 
speech which give us the moral options we can have, by giving us the means (the moral 
vocabularies) we can have of performing them. I argue that by losing touch with this text 
we have been deprived of a meaningful supply of speech acts and workable practices; I 
                                                          
* Quotation of Galateo in the text is made in accordance with the Penguin translation (G. della Casa, 
Galateo, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1959). I have constantly compared – and sometimes slightly edited - 
this translation with the Italian: G. della Casa, Galateo, a cura di S. Prandi, Einaudi, Torino, 2000. 
1 We can define, quite tentatively, a tradition of moral enquiry as a ‘stock-in-trade’ of rules and concepts 
furnishing a recognizable vocabulary by means of which we strive to understand the duties and obligations 
we incur towards each other qua human beings, citizens, family members or whasotever. See A. MacIntyre, 
After Virtue, Notre Dame University Press, 1981. 
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am also convinced that this loss can be easily detected by paying attention to several 
“random symptoms of a sickness of contact” which testify to the increasing exposure of 
our lives to the willfulness of the insolent3. To resume Adorno’s terminology, we may 
say that the Italian tradition, by focussing on an ethics of manners, tries to address that 
“elimination of distance between people” which is not being registered as a relevant 
problem by contemporary moral theory. On the contrary, there is a widespread 
insensitivity, let alone a general sense of suspicion, towards manners, for manners are 
regarded as “the tools of the snob. Snobs raise etiquette to the level of ethics. The purpose 
of manners […] is to exclude people from fastidious, worthy society”4. 
In what follows I will be doing two things: at first I will undertake an examination of 
the various ways by means of which the Galateo has imposed itself on the attention of its 
‘public’ (first Italian and then more widely European); then I will seek to show how the 
tradition of moral enquiry which originates from this text managed to survive through 
subterranean channels of influence and reception. As suggested by the title, I will do all 
of this with the eye of a student of the canons and canon-making process as well as with 
the eye of a moral philosopher. 
 
1. On the history of reception 
I intend to provide a new reading of the Galateo, which will review the ‘familiar’ 
climate in which the text has been received and possibly de-familiarize us with some 
ingrained intellectual habits as, for instance, reading the text as a ‘minor’ work, as a 
literary distraction. I will suggest that the text “eminentemente citabile” of the tradition of 
Italian treatises on manners, after enjoying a remarkable success with an Italian and 
European readership, fell into a state of almost complete illegibility, thus becoming 
obsolete coinage of a tradition that today we consider as belonging to the prehistory of 
our moral customs. The habit of reading the text within a predefined ‘model of legibility’ 
has prevented us from considering the Galateo not only as a serious work, but, all things 
considered, as a ‘tragic’ one, which epitomizes the end of a genre or a tradition, and of an 
                                                                                                                                                                             
2 This expression is in G. Contini, Un'idea di Dante. Saggi danteschi, Torino, Einaudi, 1976. 
3 See T.W. Adorno, Minima Moralia. Reflections from Damaged Life, London, Verso, 1987. 
4 A. Margalit, The Decent Society, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard Univ Press, 1998. 
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epoch too. That it is necessary to obey “not the good, but the modern custom” is, then, 
the philosophical statement which I take as my point of departure5. 
The “moderna usanza”, then. For Della Casa it was a question of rejecting 
‘perfection’, overcoming the constraint of modes of thinking which demanded unlimited 
perfection in moral action. In this sense the Galateo, in rejecting the ideal of Baldassarre 
Castiglione’s Book of the Courtier, broke off from the tradition of moral enquiry which 
had privileged the moment of moral excellence, of the heroic action, in a word, of civil 
perfection6. 
In this regard one might consider Machiavelli’s warning against gentlemen, and see 
how his invective fits his heroic ideal of citizenship, namely, his conviction that the quest 
for excellence and the pursuit of glory were motives of action applying to everyone7. 
With Della Casa and later with Stefano Guazzo, author of La civil conversazione, we 
witness a radical inversion, in the sense that these authors rediscover and value the small 
virtue of mediocritas and see in the heroic virtues of Machiavelli’s armed citizen, a threat 
to the anti-heroic peace of civilized conversation. 
However, the tradition under scrutiny - despite its presumed success - was not 
destined to last. Moral philosophy turned to other manifestations of human commonalty 
and lost the specific interest for phenomena like “decency of behaviour: as how one man 
should salute another, or how a man should wash his mouth, or pick his teeth before 
company, and such other points of Small Morals”8. 
I have called this tradition an Italian tradition, to some extent inappropriately, 
because the Man of the Cinquecento was the last “to still receive an Italian cultural 
education”9. Thus the Galateo - despite the numerous attempts to neutralize it and banish 
                                                          
5  That Della Casa was “versatissimo nello studio della filosofia morale” (extremely well-versed in the 
study of moral philosophy) is suggested by C. Berra, Il Galateo "Fatto per scherzo", in G. Barbisi-C. Berra 
(eds), Per Giovanni della Casa. Ricerche e contributi, Bologna, Monduzzi Editore, 1997, p. 283. 
6 Carlo Ossola – in its introduction to G. della Casa, Galateo, edited by S. Prandi, Torino, Einaudi, 1994 
(the edition from which I quote in the text) – emphasizes this discontinuity. 
7 “[…] to explain more clearly what is meant by the term gentlemen, I say that those are called gentlemen 
who live idly upon the proceeds of their extensive possessions, without devoting themselves to agriculture 
or any other useful pursuit to gain a living. Such men are pernicious to any country or republic […] for that 
class of men are everywhere enemies of all civil government”; N. Machiavelli, Discorsi sopra la prima 
deca di Tito Livio I, 55. 
8 T. Hobbes, Leviathan i, 11. 
9 On the Italian education of the Man of the Cinquecento, see S. Battaglia, Mitografia del personaggio, 
Milano, Rizzoli, 1970. 
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it from cultural history - remains the institutional book about a model of ‘civility of 
behaviour’ which was born and developed in Italy. This enables us to limit the area of 
enquiry to the several lineages of influence (not all visible as yet) which come together in 
the text to form an entirely new amalgam. 
When we come to explore the reasons why the ‘Italian’ tradition seems to have dried 
up, and its canonical text displaced, the whole issue seems to be open to the most diverse 
speculations. What the moral philosopher cannot but regret is that not much remains after 
such a displacement. What is left is, in any case, something which hesitates to disclose 
itself to a superficial gaze: it is, in all probability, that almost invisible ideology of 
civilitas “from which even today our everyday life depends and which as yet lacks a 
serious philosophical and historical reflection capable of enunciating the problem - which 
has made of its non-enunciability, of its anonymous state, one of its ways of unfolding 
and survival - withdrawing it from the dominion of chat to which it seems, for the time 
being, relegated”10.  
It is easy to agree with Giorgio Patrizi’s assessment of anonymity, and non-
enunciability of themes which were articulated with extraordinary force in our 
Cinquecento and which, by various routes, have ended up becoming crystallized in our 
habits, so much so that they have been rendered invisible to our very attention. And 
perhaps, it is because of this veil of familiarity, that for such a long time those themes 
have remained anonymous, and could not be enunciated in philosophical terms. 
Moreover, it is in common conversation, that the legacy of this minor literature has been 
preserved. In everyday conversation this minor literature has perhaps found a milieu more 
suitable for incubation than in the philosophical speculations of the erudite. Proof of this 
seems to be the fact that certain modes of behaviour have remained familiar to us, despite 
the fact that we have ceased to reflect on their meaning within the discipline of 
philosophy for quite some time. This is because, by surviving in literature, they have 
continued to offer a reflected image of the real world, however stylized it might be11. 
                                                          
10 G. Patrizi, La "Civil conversazione" libro europeo, in Id. (ed.), Stefano Guazzo e la civil conversazione, 
Roma, Bulzoni, 1990, p. 11. 








My aim in this paper is to plumb the depths of the chiacchiera  (chit-chat), to reach 
those deposits of meaning in which the awareness of a democratic ethos of social roles 
has remained immobile and undisturbed for centuries. What I shall endeavour to uncover 
is a tradition awaiting complete reappraisal for the validity of ideas and suggestions 
which time has crystallized within it. Patrizi’s observation is the point of departure to 
enquire into the modernity of a minor tradition of moral enquiry still awaiting interpreters 
able to carry out a methodical work of exegesis and systematization. 
 
2.  A plea for a civil conversation 
But let us come to discuss the point of interest, that is to say, the philosophical and 
moralizing ‘character’ of the tradition under scrutiny (here, so to say, the eye of the 
‘moral philosopher’ comes into play). The central theme of the Galateo consists “nel 
favellar disteso e continuato”, (Galateo, 54),  (the continued and relaxed conversation). 
The interlocutor, the recurring “tu”  in Della Casa’s text (almost certainly Annibale 
Rucellai, Della Casa’s nephew), is invited to share the custom of a liberal and disciplined 
conversation: “you should grow accustomed to use kind, modest, and sweet words, such 
that they contain no bitterness” (Galateo, 62). And further, “you will not speak of low, or 
frivolous, or vulgar, or abominable topics”  (Galateo, 65), consequently “people will 
listen to your speech with pleasure and interest, and you will retain the station and the 
dignity which is appropriate to a well brought up and behaved gentleman” (Galateo, 66). 
Let us consider, then, precisely this theme of conversation as the thread which joins 
together the Italian tradition of treatises of this kind. The Italian tradition derives from the 
medieval moral treatises for the edification of prince and courtesan. This reaches a 
turning point with the Galateo and finds in Stefano Guazzo’s Conversazione a European 
dimension of high significance. The work of Guazzo is very important in my 
reconstruction because in a certain sense it sums up and ‘urbanizes’ Della Casa’s 
proposal, in my view, in a predominantly moralizing and normative way. It stages a 
dialogue between a Cavalier who wishes to establish “la scienza sopra la solitudine” (the 
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science upon solitude), and Hannibal, for whom “the beginning and end of the science 
depends on the conversation”12. 
Here, as in the Galateo, we find, about the locus deputatus of conversation, the 
opposition between the “romitori” (hermitages) to which one withdraws to live a life of 
solitude, and the city. Here the city is a different place in relation to the court (with what 
Ezio Raimondi defines as its “scenic role ethos”13), which corresponds neither to the State 
nor to the Principality. It does not coincide with the Republic either, although a republic 
might be a city or contain many cities. The city corresponds to an emerging social 
phenomenon in which individuals live in close proximity, immersed in the common 
medium of conversation, where ‘conversation’ doesn’t comprise a mere exchange of 
information: the practice of getting on with one’s neighbours by means of conversation 
cannot be abstracted from an ethos in which formulae of greetings, thanking and 
addressing each other in public were embedded. 
It is worth noting that the city still represents the elective place in which a new way of 
thinking is formed, a new science, in opposition to a solitary conception of action, and to 
a conception of knowledge founded on contemplation14. The city, then is the place in 
which Italian authors of treatises ‘experiment’ upon the normative functioning of that 
‘new’ ethics which Hobbes was to scornfully call parva moralia. Here, the discovery of 
these Italian authors was that the ‘space’ of communication is never smooth, perfectly 
transparent to the communicative sincerity of participants, but is continually perturbed by 
obfuscations and obstacles that make a mutual understanding problematic. This idea of 
conversation, as worked out by the Italian writers, contained the possibility of 
disagreeing: the art of conversation the Italian writers wanted to introduce was the art of 
‘agreeing to disagree’, of learning how to arrange forms of civilized disagreement. In 
other words, the moral enquiry of Italian treatise writers is the expression of a culture 
which adopted a strong form of protection against the violence of disputants15. 
                                                          
12 S. Guazzo, La civil conversazione (1574), ed. A. Quondam, Modena, Panini, 1993. 
13 The expression “ethos scenografico del ruolo” is in E. Raimondi, Letteratura barocca, Firenze, Olschki, 
1985. 
14 Hannibal’s science is actually that same experimental science which progressed modern Europe beyond 
the “immobile and petrified intelligence of the Indian Brahmin and the Chinese Mandarin”; C. Cattaneo, La 
città, Milano, Bompiani, 1949, p. 119 
15 D. Quinton, Duelling and Civility in Sixteenth Century Italy, in “I Tatti Studies. Essays in the 
Renaissance”, Vol. 7, 1998, pp. 231-266 (: 249), cites the Discorsi by Annibale Romei published in 1585, 
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The ideal of ‘politezza’ sets a limit to opening up the full horizon of total 
communication. For these Italian authors of treatises, it was a question of safeguarding 
the cultural and civil singularity of those individuals who participate in democratic 
conversation, a type of conversation that does not necessarily result in agreement: the 
possibility is left open that a meeting between participants may not reach a satisfactory 
conclusion; that a reservation, an irreconcilable zone of disagreement and non-
communication, may be expressed. If we look at the contemporary debate on ethics, 
whereas communication ethics hypothesize an action which is perfectly inclusive of the 
reasons of the other, the proposed ethics (or Italian ethics), which do not recognize any 
virtuous action outside their own inherited codes of civility, consider as a priority the 
uses and the conventions by means of which individuals endeavour to reach mutual 
agreement. 
One point requires clarification: promoting conversation as a value of civilization 
does not mean protecting the dishonest, those who are capable of confounding their 
interlocutor by dissimulating a favor: in particular, Della Casa’s reservation is towards 
those “uomini letterati” who “per pompa di loro parlare fanno bene spesso che il torto 
vince e che la ragione perde” (those men of letters who by the pomp of their eloquence 
are often able to secure the victory of wrong and the defeat of reason). It seems to me 
that Torquato Tasso’s fictitious character of the deceiving Alete “gran fabro di calunnie, 
adorne in modi / novi, che sono accuse, e paion lodi” (great fabricator of lies, dressed in 
novel ways / which, though they seem to be praises, are accusations), is based on this 
type16. 
In the following section I will seek to show how these Italian writers on manners 
succeeded in creating a living code of transmission of workable models of co-existence 
                                                                                                                                                                             
in which cavalier Camilio Gualengo states that “the matter of duels belongs to jurists and not to moral 
philosophers”. Quinton rightly observes that duels prove the survival of an ancien regime mentality, and 
are the sign of a widespread discontent among the aristocratic class towards the process of ‘civilization’. It 
is, in my view, in this context of widespread conflict and litigation that the proposal of Della Casa seen as a 
moral philosopher should be situated. In particular, I would like to focus on his idea of self-discipline, of 
refusal to enter into conflict (in conformity with a truly ‘modern’ ideal, as yet not shared by the codes of 
honor which were still in force at the time). It constitutes, ultimately, the idea of a ‘Cadmean victory’, that 
is to say, the ability to activate ethics of restraint, to put into operation those bracketing strategies that allow 
a rational escape route from the threat of conflict. On this ‘philosophical’ point, see S. Wall, Liberalism, 
Perfectionism and Restraint, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1998, p. 32. 
16 T. Tasso, Gerusalemme liberata ii, 58. 
  
Canon-Making and the




and of conversation which was going to establish itself as canonical all over Europe and 
which still has currency in some areas of our cultural universe. I believe that the diffusion 
- and subsequent translation - of a work like the Galateo, enabled a collection of symbols 
and ‘characters’ to be established. These would have served the purpose of guaranteeing 
the constitution of ‘texts’ or ‘codes’ which could be recognized and interpreted. At a 
certain point it seemed that a certain code of civilitas was about to become progressively 
authoritative in Europe as a result of the formation of a common lexicon of the traits, of a 
European canon which had become familiar to a broad social spectrum. But, as I have 
stated above, this canon represents an interrupted pathway of the Italian Renaissance, a 
route which at a certain point petered out. 
My aim is to re-establish a tradition whose provenance has been partly lost, and 
piecing together the historical narratives of an influence, which, as I have said above, at a 
certain point in time, was interrupted. It is a matter of recovering both the key concepts of 
the Galateo, as well as those characteristics of the tradition under consideration which 
were, for some time, icons or recognizable symbols of a European koiné which had 
accepted certain rules and conventions of civilitas that seem to us, centuries later, 
arbitrary and vague. 
 
3.  A non-canonical tradition of moral enquiry 
My aim in this section is to show that the seminal text of the Renaissance traditions of 
manners paved the way to an enduring speculative fashion by which writers on manners 
articulated a pattern of moral enquiry which had currency all over Europe for a long 
time17. 
                                                          
17 A. St George, The Descent into Manners, Etiquette, Rules and the Victorians, London, Chatto & Windus, 
1993, was the first sign of a renewed interest for the Italian tradition. The book rediscovered the central 
relevance of a reflection on etiquette and manners in the mid-Victorian period that was not only associated 
with the salons, but also the literary world and public sphere. St George maintains that in 1576, with the 
first translation into English of the Galateo, “the tradition which was to flower in the mid-Victorian 
summer had been planted”: ibidem, p. 3. In the course of a few years, works which do not appear to have 
found a place in the official channels of the debate on ethics have been published: M. Kingwell, A Civil 
Tongue. Justice, Dialogue, and the Politics of Pluralism, University Park-Penn., The Pennsylvania State 
University Press, 1995. D. Anderson, Gentility Recalled. Mere Manners and the Making of Social Order, 
London, Social Affairs Unit, 1996. J. Martin, Who Killed Modern Manners?, in A. Etzioni (ed.), The 
Essential Communitarian Reader, Lanham, Rowman & Littlefield, 1998, pp. 295-301. J. Arditi, A 
Genealogy of Manners. Transformation of Social Relations in France and England from the Fourteenth to 
the Eighteenth Century, Chicago & London, Chicago University Pr., 1998. I myself have expanded on this 
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The Italian tradition is a minor tradition, which within modernity has suffered a 
condition of subordinateness towards the hegemonic tradition, which came about as a 
comprehensive commentary on Hobbes’s claim that moral philosophy shouldn’t busy 
itself with issues of small morals. A key-concept which enables us to distinguish these 
two traditions on the basis of how they employ this concept, albeit towards opposite ends, 
is the concept of ‘imitation’. 
We are used to taking for granted that the tradition of moral enquiry which goes back 
to Hobbes is the ‘dominant’ tradition in so far as the the concepts and practical modalities 
of interaction to which that tradition accords viability and authoritativeness are concepts 
and modalities of interactions which stand as indisputed fragment of the kind of moral 
discourse with which we are most familiar in the Western world. Thus, the so-called 
Hobbesian tradition is currently the strongest candidate, among a number of viable 
traditions of moral enquiry, to offer a comprehensive moral vision, one which allows us 
to articulate consistently our mutual moral commitments. But at closer scrutiny we can 
see that almost every day we employ resources of moral understanding which didn’t 
occur in that Hobbesian framework and nevertheless have remained unexplored. Indeed it 
was Hobbes himself who promoted his view on man in society by discrediting a 
flourishing tradition of moral enquiry which had not relied – as Hobbes did – on the 
rational autonomy of the individual, but had stressed the significance of imitation in 
modeling human relationship. Hobbes’s critique aims to unveil the negative implications 
of assuming the positive ethical function of habits and role models18. 
But what is the distinctive feature of this hegemonic tradition of moral enquiry? I may 
reply to this question by saying that from Hobbes onwards, moral philosophy focusses on 
the individual as an independent moral agent: human beings, according to Hobbes, have 
“to be taught that they ought not be led with admiration of the virtue of any of their 
fellow subjects” (xxx; 8). Emphasis is on the ideal of a person capable mentally, and able 
in the real world to navigate a course through life, to be part creator of himself, and part 
                                                                                                                                                                             
retrieval of the ‘Italian tradition’: see R. Farneti, Una civile conversazione. Una proposta di etica italiana, 
in “Iride” 3, 2000. 
18 Hobbes maintains that “ignorance of the causes and original constitution of right, equity, law, and justice 
disposeth a man to make custom and example the rule of his actions, in such manner as to think that unjust 
which it hath been the custom to punish, and that just, of the impunity and approbation whereof they can 
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author of his life; such a person is the creator of her own moral world and by no means is 
subjected to the will of others19. As a matter of fact, when we describe ourselves and 
account for the several ways we move through society we rely on a normative pattern 
which goes back to a moral vision that is at least partly constitutive of the ways in which 
we continue to make sense of our own political practices. And it is worth noting that such 
a vision also has bearing on a theory of morality which has selected itself as a dominant 
strain in the history of moral thought. 
The ‘minor’ tradition holds a different conception about imitation. This tradition is 
motivated by the perception that when moral agents think about moral questions, they do 
so not in terms of abstract  principles with an aim to systematise some large chunk of 
moral experience, but in terms of concrete relationships with other people within the 
context of their understanding of those relationships, and the institutions and practices in 
which they are embedded. 
It is worth noting that Giovanni della Casa, as well as other Italian moralists, draws 
extensively on this distinction between “role models” and the self-expression of an 
autonomous, rational moral point of view: in his book he rhetorically asks “how much 
more likely is it that we should become better under the guidance of our own reason, if 
we gave it our ears?” (G, 71). In a recent restatement of this Italian tradition, Mark 
Kingwell recurs to the argument originally put forward by Della Casa, and points out that 
“civility” “has to do with getting along with one another in society, not with reaching the 
truth or articulating the best possible theory or moral vision”20. 
This tradition doesn’t bring forward any abstract model of moral behaviour; it relies 
entirely on the function of role models in transmitting valuable chunks of moral 
experience. Its emphasis is not on the idea of communication, of a mutual understanding 
which is disembodied from those habits and practices which regulate the criteria of how 
participants get along with each other. The tradition under scrutiny refers instead to 
conversation, that is to the practice of conversation. The main concern of the Italian 
writers is not self expression but a ‘modern’ habit of conversation: that is, how to 
                                                                                                                                                                             
produce an example […] like little children, that have no other rule of good and evil manners but the 
corrections they receive from their parents and masters” (Leviathan xi, 21). 
19 See J. Raz, The Morality of Freedom, Oxford, Clarendon, 1986. Raz has expanded on this topic in an 
interview: Filosofia e pratica della libertà, in “Iride” 37, 2002, pp. 475-509. 
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elaborate a workable ideal of conversation which may balance expression of oneself with 
respect towards the other participants to conversation. 
The central theme of the Galateo consists in entertaining others with speeches which 
must “be well arranged and expressed, with description of the conduct, demeanour, 
dispositions, and habits of the people of whom you are  talking, so that the audience may 
be given the impression, not of listening to a tale, but of seeing the action unfold before 
their eyes” (Galateo, 54). 
This concern for the practice of conversation and for its apprehension through a 
repeated usage is one of the distinctive features of this tradition. One of the most direct 
statements of this idea of ‘practice’ has been made by A.S. Byatt, who clearly points out 
in her novel The Game that “we learn virtue by putting ourselves in a position where we 
cannot refuse to exercise it”21. Byatt refers certainly not to the tradition which goes back 
to Hobbes. She implicitly refers to a pragmatic tradition of moral enquiry, more attentive 
towards the significance of role models in the developing of human behaviour, a tradition 
in which are embedded the fundamental values cherished by Della Casa. 
The Hobbesian trail is in the nineteenth century the major trail of moral enquiry. John 
Stuart Mill, one of the prominent representatives of this tradition, claimed that one cannot 
attribute to human beings “the mimetic talent of monkeys”: it seems to me that here the 
thread of the Italian tradition is definitely broken. Think of the dedicatory letter of 
Guazzo’s Civil Conversation, to Vespasiano Gonzaga Colonna, where the author recalled 
the conversation that had inspired his book, and proclaimed he had “come over as a 
monkey, trying to imitate the better I could that very first example”22. 
 
4.   The anxiety of influence 
One question which seems to be natural to ask is whether this tradition still has a 
grasp on our implicit strategies of moral understanding, and how, and by what means, we 
may manage to preserve its influence. A tentative answer to this question is that the moral 
legacy of this ‘minor’ tradition has been preserved in literature. I cannot give here an 
                                                                                                                                                                             
20 M. Kingwell, A Civil Tongue, p. 218. 
21 A.S. Byatt, The Game, London, Vintage, 1999. 








exhaustive account of how that influence has been developed, but I can indicate a few 
interesting cases in point, which seem to offer some clues as to the survival of the Italian 
tradition in literature: examples may be cited from the work of Italian writers such as 
Curzio Malaparte, Giuseppe Tomasi di Lampedusa and Elsa Morante, to name but a 
few23. It is worth noting that this tradition is subsumed in a Wirkungsgeschichte, or a 
history of effects, in which that which is to be influenced loses all sense of its own 
developmental history in the very process of transformation: the tradition, in other words, 
loses its Italian background and comes to be regarded as a kind of pseudo-cultural 
universal emptied of its original form and content24. Thus, the influence of this tradition, 
namely its ability to provide a workable set of role models and codes by which 
individuals may attune their behaviour to a pre-defined and easily recognizable standard 
of decorum, is consigned to narrow channels of cultural exchange and communication. It 
would also be interesting to identify the dynamics by which the influence of the texts 
“eminentemente citabili” of the Italian tradition has been quenched, and to see how this 
process has occassioned the demise of certain modes of structuring human behaviour. 
In the Independent of 1 March 2001 columnist Angela Lambert pointed to the 
incapacity of feminism to articulate an effective moral discourse on role models. She 
maintained that young people have lost tenderness, judgement, any realistic sense of their 
own place and value, decorum (not an absurd attribute, at least in public) and self control. 
Lambert asks to herself “how did things get so far? What are the influences, role models 
                                                          
23 See Giuseppe Tomasi di Lampedusa, Il Gattopardo, Milano, Giangiacomo Feltrinelli Editore, 1958, p. 
129 (Engl. Transl. by A. Colquhoun: The Leopard, New York, Pantheon, p. 159): Let’s read from Tomasi 
di Lampedusa’s The Leopard: “many problems that had seemed insoluble to the Prince were resolved in a 
trice by Don Calogero; free as he was from the shackles imposed on many other men by honesty, decency, 
and plain good manners, he moved through the jungle of life with the confidence of an elephant which 
advances in a straight line, rooting up trees and trampling down lairs, without even noticing scratches of 
thorns and moans from the crushed. Reared and tended in tranquil vales across which blew the courtesies of 
‘please’, ‘I’d be so grateful’, ‘How very kind’, the Prince, when talking to Don Calogero, now found 
himself on an open heath swept by searing winds, and although continuing in his heart to prefer defiles in 
the hills he could not help admiring this surge and sweep which drew from the plane trees and cedars of 
Donnafugata notes never heard before”. 
24 Think of the extraordinary monologue of Mr Stevens in Ishiguro’s The Remains of the Day, in which at 
stake is the superior capacity of the English of that ‘emotional countenance’ which distinguishes them from 
the Continentals: “Continentals […] are as a rule unable to control themselves in moments of strong 
emotion, and are thus unable to maintain a professional demeanour other than in the least challenging of 
situations. […] they are like a man who will, at the slightest provocation, tear off his suit and his shirt and 
run about screaming. In a word, ‘dignity’ is beyond such persons”; K. Ishiguro, The Remains of the Day, 
London, Faber, 1999. 
  
Canon-Making and the




and aspirations of these violent young women who form gangs, drink, smoke, swear and 
parade themselves halfnaked, laughing, sneering, leering like their male counterparts”25. 
Lambert points out that more self-conscious and purposeful moral thinking must address 
this set of questions. Even if it cannot reverse the trend, it must go on tentatively to argue 
about the social implications of decent behaviour. Lambert concludes asking: “where are 
the role models?” 
I wonder if the time hasn’t come for the dominant tradition of moral enquiry, which 
relies upon autonomy and self-expression, to confront its failure. We all in modern 
Western democracies enjoy the extraordinary liberty we have struggled for centuries to 
achieve, but apparently have lost the sense of how to use it. Perhaps we have to look back 




                                                          
25 I added the italics at the end of the quote to stress my sympathy with a colleague at the Italian Academy, 
who remarked that this quote might sound insensitive towards women. 
